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1 Introduction
The theory on durable-good monopoly, originated with Coase’s conjecture, is one the
best understood models of dynamic competition in economics.1 It is of great value
if the implications of a structure so well explored can be exported to other fields of
economics. An important field where Coase’s insight has been seen to apply is the theory
of exhaustible resources, put forward by Hotelling (1931). Indeed, Ho¨rner and Kamien
(2004) establish an important equivalence between the durable-good monopoly and the
exhaustible-resource monopsony: under full commitment, the two problems ”differ only in
the interpretations placed on symbols.” Since the two problems share the same structure,
one may very well conclude that the equilibrium outcomes without commitment are also
equivalent, so that the conditions well understood for the Coase conjecture to hold could
be readily applied to the resource problem. In this paper, we challenge this view. The
surplus-sharing in the resource model is shaped by the resource substitute, an essential
element of the resource model having no natural counterpart in durable-good theory.
For durable goods, the Coase conjecture can arise only if consumer valuations decline
with the stock of the good in the market. As lower valuation consumers are expected to
enter the market at some future date, current buyers can gain from waiting. According
to the conjecture, the monopolist sells at the lowest valuation price when buyers are
patient enough. In the resource monopsony, the stock is the amount of resource already
extracted, and the value changing with the stock is the sellers’ extraction cost. The
conjecture is then that if the low-cost sellers can wait for the high-cost sellers to enter
the market, they will do so and, thereby, force the buyer to pay his choke value for the
resource, i.e., the price above which its demand for the resource falls to zero. In this
sense, the buyer’s monopsony power vanishes ”in the twinkling of an eye,” as expressed
by Coase in connection with the durable-good monopoly.
Our result is that the above analog does not hold when the resource choke value is
determined by the utility the buyer gets from switching to a substitute technology or
supply. In resource economics, this is the prevailing, if not the only, interpretation of
1The conjecture was presented in Coase (1972). In the literature that follows, the conjecture is un-
derstood as the entire loss of monopoly power when consumers are patient enough. Early formalizations
are Stokey (1981), and Bulow (1982). The monopolist may escape the conjecture, at least partially, if:
marginal production costs are convex (Kahn, 1986); reputational strategies can be used (Ausubel and
Deneckere, 1989); a price-quantity scheme can be used to discriminate among discrete buyers (Bagnoli
et al., 1989); the good depreciates (Karp, 1996); there is entry of new consumers (Sobel, 1991); or there
are capacity costs (McAfee and Wiseman, 2008)
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the choke price (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). Substitutes that put a cap on
the resource price are often called backstop technologies, after Nordhaus’ (1973) work
exploring the effect of future backstops on resource prices. A switch to the backstop
or alternative supply implies that the resource stock will be consumed during a finite
period of time. According to the conjecture, in this situation sellers would take a larger
share of the surplus the steeper is the rise in their cost curve. When extraction costs
do not depend on the evolution of the stock, the buyer should achieve its first-best and
appropriate the whole surplus.
We find that the surplus-sharing in the resource market follows a logic different from
that suggested by the durable-good analog provided that the buyer switches to a substi-
tute at some date. Sellers always get some surplus due to their ability to wait for the
buyer’s outside option; even in the absence of extraction costs. In other words, we do not
require competitive agents with different valuations (costs) to force the buyer to give up
some of its monopsony rents, which is in sharp contrast with the durable-good monopoly
theory where consumers’ heterogeneity is the driving force behind the Coase conjecture.
Moreover, for durable goods, extreme patience means that transactions are frequent, so
that the market is served quickly in real time, and this type of patience is enough for
the conjecture to arise. For resources, the physical depletion of the stock may take long
even when transactions are frequent, and the Coase conjecture requires extreme patience,
i.e., the willingness to wait for the exhaustion date and the arrival of the substitute. In
the absence of discounting, we find that the Coase conjecture arises and sellers capture
the full resource surplus, even though the conjecture does not arise in the durable-good
equivalent. The result can still be called after Coase since it arises from the market’s
ability to wait for the buyer’s outside valuation price, and thus the mechanism follows
Coase’s reasoning. With positive discounting but arbitrarily frequent transactions, the
parties share the surplus depending on the relative sizes of the substitute utility and
remaining stock.
The market for oil has motivated much of the literature on optimal tariffs on ex-
haustible resources (e.g., Maskin and Newbery, 1990; Karp and Newbery, 1993). The
durable-good analog would imply a large potential for extracting the sellers’ resource
rent when the oil production cost is largely independent of the stock level. This situa-
tion best describes the conventional, cheap oil stock which is mainly held by the OPEC
group. One may argue that the conventional oil stock is the exhaustible-resource in
the oil market, and the nonconventional oils are rather the substitute commodities. For
this situation, our results suggests a conclusion that is quite different from that of the
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durable-good analog. According to our results, the cheap oil producers receive a price
comparable to the cost of supplying the substitute, not their own cost. The buyer’s side
effort to coordinate demand reduction through tariffs or other policies can depress the
price but they do so only by delaying the arrival of the substitute —and the potential
for price depressing is greater the larger is the remaining resource stock.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the com-
mitment solutions for both models using Kahn’s (1986) framework for the durable-good
monopoly. This model is a natural choice as it embeds common interpretations of both
resource and durable-good problems (Ho¨rner and Kamien, 2004). With the help of this
model we show that explicit attention to the choke price is not important for the com-
mitment solutions (as Ho¨rner and Kamien’s result suggests). In Section 3, we study the
subgame-perfect equilibrium for the resource model and establish the main result of the
paper. The final section concludes and discusses ways to escape the conjecture in the
resource context.
2 Commitment solutions: First look at differences
As in Kahn (1986), the durable-good monopolist is a single producer of a perfectly durable
good. For exposition, we assume a perfect re-sale or rental market.2 The monopolist
sells the good by giving away the property right, but the subsequent users may also rent
it. The flow valuation of the service provided by the good is a function of the total
cumulative stock of the good produced up to time t. We denote the stock by St and the
flow valuation by P (St) which is a monotone non-increasing function defined on [0, S¯].
There is a continuum of potential buyers. If the path (Sz)z≥t is known and sales take
place at t, the market clears at a price that gives the capitalized value of the marginal
unit sold at t:
p˜t =
∫ ∞
t
P (Sz)e
−δ(z−t)dz (1)
where δ is the discount rate.
The monopolist has convex cost of production γ(qt) that depends on the rate of
production qt = dSt/dt. If the monopoly can commit to a path (Sz)z≥t at t = 0, it will
2Whether or not the rental market exists is inconsequential when there is a continuum of agents.
We can assume that each consumer buys either one or zero unit of the good, and disappears after the
purchase. Alternatively, the buyers can be intermediaries who use the goods to serve the resale or rental
market.
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choose this path solving
max
qt
∫ ∞
0
{ptqt − γ(qt)}e
−δtdt
subject to (1), qt = dSt/dt, and S0 ≥ 0. Using (1), this problem can be rewritten as
max
qt
∫ ∞
0
{P (St)(St − S0)− γ(qt)}e
−δtdt
for which the first-order conditions imply that positive sales satisfy
P (St) + P
′(St)(St − S0) = δγ
′(qt)− γ
′′(qt)
dqt
dt
. (2)
The left-hand side of (2) is the marginal revenue from renting an additional unit, and the
right-hand side is the marginal cost of producing that unit today rather than tomorrow.
For the Hotelling monopsony, we assume that there is a single importer (buyer) of
an exhaustible resource. The buyer’s utility depends on the rate of consumption qt.
We denote his utility by U(qt). Each supplier has one unit of the resource and a given
cost of extracting and selling that unit. We assume a continuum of suppliers indexed
by S ∈ [0, S¯] and that the unit cost depends on this index; the unit cost is given by a
nondecreasing function c(St). In continuous time then, c(St)qt is the cost of extracting
at rate qt when the stock already extracted or consumed is St.
For a given path (Sz)z≥t, market clearing requires that at all times, where sales take
place, the sales price satisfies the following arbitrage condition (i.e., Hotelling rule)
dpt
dt
= δ(pt − c(St)),
which, after some manipulation, can be rewritten as
pt = e
δt(K −
∫ t
0
δe−δzc(Sz)dz) (3)
where K is a constant of integration that corresponds to p0. Since pt is bounded by some
finite value, namely the price of the alternative supply, we can let t −→ ∞ and evaluate
K as
K =
∫ ∞
0
δc(St)e
−δtdt. (4)
which leads to
pt =
∫ ∞
t
δc(Sz)e
−δ(z−t)dz. (5)
Note already that expression (5) looks remarkably similar to (1) but for the ”symbols.”
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If the resource monopsony can commit to a path (Sz)z≥t at t = 0, it will choose this
path by solving
max
qt
∫ ∞
0
{U(qt)− ptqt}e
−δtdt
subject to (3), qt = dSt/dt, St ≤ S¯, and S0 = 0. Using (5), we can rewrite the objective
function to see that the optimal (Sz)z≥0 also maximizes
∫ ∞
0
{U(qt)− δc(St)St}e
−δtdt.
Over the interval of time of positive sales, the optimal consumption must satisfy3
c(St) + c
′(St)St = U
′(qt)−
1
δ
U ′′(qt)
dqt
dt
. (6)
The left-hand side of (6) is the marginal cost from buying an extra unit and the right-hand
side is the marginal benefit of consuming that unit today rather than tomorrow.
In view of the conditions (2) and (6) and price functions (1) and (5), the equivalence
noted by Ho¨rner and Kamien (2004) is apparent: renaming P (S) as −δc(S), γ(q) as
−U(qt), and p˜t as −pt shows that the commitment solutions differ only in the interpre-
tations placed on symbols. Note in particular that when cost γ(q) is strictly convex, the
Coase monopoly has preferences for production smoothing. This corresponds to prefer-
ences for consumption smoothing in the Hotelling model, arising when the utility function
is strictly concave.
The Coasian commitment problem is known to arise because of declining consumer
valuations given by strictly declining P (S). Current consumers can benefit from waiting
and delaying purchases only if lower valuation consumers are anticipated to enter the
market in the future. Formally, the source of the inconsistency can be seen from equation
(2) where the initial stock S0 enters only if P
′(S) 6= 0; if the monopoly could reconsider
the plan (Sz)z≥t chosen at t = 0 at some future date t
′ > 0, the initial condition would
change from S0 to St′ , leading to a change in the solution.
The above reasoning suggests that the problem of commitment arises in the resource
model only when the extraction cost c(St) is strictly increasing. According to the con-
jectured analog, the low cost sellers can benefit from delaying sales only when high cost
3In terms of the remaining stock, denoted by Qt = S¯ − St, eq. (6) becomes (see, e.g., Karp and
Newbery, 1993, p. 894)
c(Qt)− c
′(Qt)(Q0 −Qt) = U
′(qt)−
1
δ
U ′′(qt)
dqt
dt
where Q0 = S¯, dQt/dt = −qt, and c
′(Qt) ≤ 0.
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sellers are anticipated to enter the market in the future. In other words, if c′(St) = 0,
the consumption dynamics solved at any future date t > 0 are identical to those solved
at t = 0. In this case the buyer has no incentives to deviate from the consumption path
that he announced at t = 0.
We challenge this reasoning: it does not hold if the resource buyer switches to an
alternative supply at some date. Suppose the buyer’s benefit from switching to the
alternative supply isW > 0 per period. In our setting, this benefit can be easily captured
as W ≡ W (q¯) = U(q¯) − p¯q¯, where p¯ = U ′(q¯) is the unit price of the alternative supply
—also known as the choke price— and q¯ is the amount of alternative supply measured
in exhaustible-resource equivalents. We argue that the Coasian commitment problem
follows a different logic in the resource model as long as W (q¯) > 0; no matter how small
this value is.
Before stating our result formally, let us note that the difference between the models
is already visible in the commitment solutions. For example, when c(St) = c, the price
path for the commitment solution is given by
pt = e
δt[p0 − c] + c
for qt > q¯. The initial price p0 is a choice variable for the monopsonist in that its level
can be chosen by the shape of the consumption path. In particular, the buyer prefers to
commit not to use the substitute for a long time if the backstop utility is negligible, i.e., if
W (q¯) is close to zero. In this case, the buyer will commit to a path (Sz)z≥0 that postpones
the consumption of an ε-amount —more precisely, the smallest possible amount— of the
resource for far enough into the future.4 This destroys the sellers’ option of waiting: p0
collapses to cost c as the sellers race for early sales.5 Clearly, if such commitment is not
feasible in (subgame-perfect) equilibrium, sellers cannot be left with no rents.
By looking at price equations (1) and (5), it is evident that the equivalence found by
Ho¨rner and Kamien (2004) requires that prices be governed by the exact same rules. As
indicated in (1), in a Coase-world prices are fully determined by the stock path chosen by
the monopolist. Likewise, equation (5) says that in a Hotelling-world prices would also be
fully governed by the stock path chosen by the monopsonist. But (5) totally neglects the
fact that the existence of an alternative supply prevents the very last unit of the stock to
be sold for anything less than p¯ (recall that in constructing (5) we never imposed p¯ as the
4In the durable-good equivalent, that is, with P ′(S) = 0, the monopolist does not need leave an
ε-fraction of consumers for late delivery in other to implement its first-best.
5The time τ at which the buyer consumes the ε-amount solves p¯e−δτ = c.
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terminal price).6 As long as p¯ represents the substitute cost, the commitment solutions
are not exactly identical; although the difference is negligible when W (q¯) is close to zero.
Yet, this slight difference in the commitment solutions explains why the subgame-perfect
solutions can differ so dramatically. We turn to this now.
3 The difference between the models
In the resource model it is natural to have the stock be consumed gradually over time
and the switch to the substitute supply take place at some date. These properties are
ensured by the strictly concave utility function and the substitute benefit W (q¯) > 0.
For durable goods, the corresponding specification exhibits strictly convex production
cost γ(q), and P (S¯) > γ(0) = 0. From Kahn (1986), we know that the durable-good
seller’s commitment problem arises from the changing consumer valuation, not from
convex costs. One may thus conjecture that the monopoly can achieve its first-best in
the subgame-perfect equilibrium when the consumer valuation is constant, i.e., P (S) = v
for all S ∈ [0, S¯], but costs are still convex. For the resource model, the analogous
specification favoring the strategic buyer is one in which extraction costs are constant,
i.e., c(St) = c < p¯, while the utility is strictly concave.
To isolate the commitment problem coming from the substitute price, it helps to state
the difference between the models using constant valuations for the durable good and
constant costs for the exhaustible resource. We will show that the bargaining powers
emerge in opposite ways in the two models. Moving to increasing stock-dependent costs
does not eliminate the sellers’ bargaining power coming from the substitute price; on the
contrary, it is expected to reinforce it.
3.1 The durable-good benchmark
Assume thus for the durable-good model the following variant of the Kahn’s (1986)
framework: the consumer valuation is a constant P (S) = v for all S ∈ [0, S¯], and the
production cost γ(q) is assumed to be strictly convex. Note that there is a continuum
of consumers. We consider the subgame-perfect equilibrium, and for this we want to
assume discrete time periods to make the extensive form of the game clear. The discrete
periods extend to infinity, t = 0, 1, 2, ... At each period t, the monopolist chooses qt, and
6With or without commitment, right after buying the last unit for something less than p¯ the buyer
is ready to buy at p¯ from the alternative supply. Such a price jump cannot occur in either case.
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after this, the competitive market determines price pt.
We look for a sales strategy qt = qt(ht) that depends on the history ht at each t where
ht = ((q0, p0), (q1, p1), ..., (qt−1, pt−1)) ∈ R
2t
+ .
The pricing strategy for the market is a function of the history and the seller’s current
choice, pt = pt(ht, qt). Finding the equilibrium for this specification is a simple under-
taking. We verify that the monopolist’s first best is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The
result holds for any period length, implying that the commitment built into the period
length is not important.
In discrete time, the commitment solution is a sequence {St}
N
t=0 such that (i) SN = S¯,
(ii) the marginal profit is the same from each period in present value, and that (iii) it is
not optimal to extend the sales period from N . The last two requirements imply
v − γ′(qt) = β(v − γ
′(qt+1)) for all 0 ≤ t < N,
v − γ′(qN ) ≥ β(v − γ
′(0)),
where β = e−δ∆ is the continuous-time discount factor over the period ∆ (we can set
∆ = 1 here). The monopolist maximizes social surplus. When the consumer valuation is
constant, the seller has socially optimal incentives for production smoothing. Note that
the market is served in finite time, N <∞.
Denote now the socially optimal production rule by q∗t = q
∗(St). Note that when the
equilibrium horizon is finite, it is sufficient to let sales depend exclusively on the current
stock; hence, we can let ht = St be the payoff-relevant history (see, e.g., Kahn, 1986).
Consider then the strategy qt(ht) = q
∗(St) for the seller, and p(St, ·) = v for the market.
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Clearly, the seller cannot have profitable one-shot deviations from q∗(St). But neither
has the buyer side of market from p(St, ·); no surplus is available in any conceivable
continuation game.
For intuition, note that rental value v for the good remains even when the monopolist
leaves the market. The market cannot resist buying the last units at that value, which
gives the bargaining power to the seller. If there is no rental market and individuals
leave the market at purchase, the conclusion remains the same. The seller can achieve
the first-best by leaving an ε-mass of consumers unserved in the last period N . The price
will jump to v, because no surplus is expected in continuation games as it is subgame-
perfect for the seller to follow the same strategy of leaving some remaining consumers
7We can drop the dependence on t in strategies because the strategies defined this way are stationary.
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unserved in all subsequent periods.8 The welfare loss can be made arbitrarily small.
And if instead of setting quantitities the monopoly seller is setting prices, the first-best
remains an equilibrium both with and without the rental market: the seller prices at v
for all t and buyers consume along the efficient path.
3.2 The resource substitute and the Coase conjecture
Let us then turn to the equivalent exhaustible-resource monopsony, where c(St) = c for
all S ∈ [0, S¯], utility U(q) is assumed to be strictly concave, and there is finite choke
value p¯ = U ′(q¯) > c. The socially optimal allocation is a sequence {St}
N
t=0 exhausting
the stock, SN = S¯, equalizing present-value net marginal utilities, and keeping the latter
above the choke value:
U ′(qt)− c = β(U
′(qt+1)− c) for all 0 ≤ t < N,
U ′(qN)− c ≥ β(U
′(q¯)− c).
This plan is also the monopsonist’s first-best consumption plan if he can commit to
it. When the substitute utility W (q¯) is small, the buyer would like to commit to switch
to the substitute far into the future. We have already explained how commitment can
transfer the full surplus to the buyer: an ε-amount is left for later consumption enough
for destroying the ”boundary value” in the sellers’ price path. The buyer purchases at
cost and consumes according to the first-best plan.
However, the buyer’s commitment plan is not subgame-perfect ifW (q¯) > 0 (or q¯ > 0),
not matter how small q¯ and W (q¯) are. For ease of presentation, from now on we will
focus on the stock still left in the ground,
Qt = S¯ − St.
Proposition 1 Consider a given Qt, constant cost c < p¯ = U
′(q¯) < U ′(0), and period
length ∆ for consumption. As ∆→ 0:
1. Buyer shares the resource surplus with the sellers as long as q¯ > 0 and δ > 0;
2. Coase conjecture arises if δ = 0 and q¯ > 0;
3. Buyer receives the full surplus if δ > 0 and q¯ = 0.
Without loss of generality we set c = 0 here and in the Appendix where we present
the formal proof for the continuous-time consumption rule. (The results do not depend
8If the seller brings the ε-amount to the market the remaining ε-consumers will bid it down to zero.
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on whether the buyer sets quantities or prices in each period; we assume quantity setting
in this proof.) We start by explaining the first result where the buyer and the sellers
share the resource surplus when there is discounting (δ > 0) and some substitute utility
(q¯ > 0). Both the Coase conjecture and the last item, corresponding to the durable-good
analog, follow as limiting cases.
Let us first explain what defines the respective bargaining powers of the buyer and
the sellers using discrete time periods, ∆ = 1. Suppose that stock Q0 is depleted in N
periods. The first N prices are then
p0 = β
1p1 = ... = β
N−1pN = β
N p¯ (7)
because the sellers must be indifferent between sales periods as long as there is some
stock left.9 If the buyer decides to delay the exhaustion of the stock, this can be achieved
by demanding q¯ units less during the N first stages and save these units to stage N + 1.
This one period delay of the substitute arrival implies prices
p0 = β
1p1 = ... = β
NpN+1 = β
N+1p¯. (8)
The consumption-cost difference in the scenarios (7) and (8) is
βN p¯(Q0 + q¯)− β
N+1p¯Q0 = β
N(1− β)p¯Q0 + β
N p¯q¯ (9)
In both scenarios, consumptions and prices are the same after stage N + 1, because q¯ is
consumed with price p¯ in each period. We can thus focus on the difference in the first
N +1 periods. In (7), the buyer consumes q¯ in period N +1, but in (8) this consumption
comes from the stock, which explains the last term in (9). The interpretation of (9)
is then that by reducing consumption by q¯ over N periods, the buyer receives a price
discount on the full stock, βN(1−β)p¯Q0, plus the savings from the substitute cost in one
period, βN p¯q¯.
In subgame-perfect equilibrium, the buyer chooses consumption and, thus, how much
to delay the arrival of the substitute on a period-by-period basis; not over the entire
consumption plan as described above. To get an idea of the costs and benefits of today’s
consumption choice, consider the first period equilibrium consumption q0, and a one-
shot deviation from the equilibrium such that the full consumption q0 is saved and the
substitute q¯ is consumed instead. If the period length is ∆ 6= 1, the implied overall saving
9The last price pN at stage N equals the next period discounted choke price βp¯ since the buyer
demands some arbitrarily small ε less than the remaining stock to allocate some sellers to sell jointly
with the subsitute and, thereby, achieve the lowest possible price at stage N .
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is ∆q0. Since we are considering a deviation from the equilibrium, the consumption
sequence is delayed by exactly one period with no further effect on equilibrium choices.
This gives the price gain per unit of consumption saved as
βN(1− β)p¯
Q0
∆q0
+ βN p¯.
In the continuous-time limit, ∆→ 0, this expression becomes
e−δT δp¯
Q0
q0
+ e−δT p¯ = p0δ
Q0
q0
+ p0,
where T is the equilibrium time to exhaustion, and p0 is the current price that equals the
discounted choke price. In continuous time, even small changes in current consumption
will alter the overall depletion time, allowing us to express the cost of giving up current
consumption as the current marginal utility loss. Therefore, at any t before exhaustion,
the continuous-time equilibrium condition that balances the buyer’s costs and benefits
of delaying consumption is
U ′(qt) = δpt
Qt
qt
+ pt. (10)
In Appendix we derive this equilibrium consumption rule formally. Note that the
first term in right hand side of (10) includes the interest earning on total present-value
purchases along the equilibrium path from time t onwards. That sum is divided by q to
transform it into marginal units, relevant for current consumption choice.
In view of the above, it is clear that the buyer’s bargaining power arises from the
ability to destroy overall surplus through delayed purchases. This incentive to delay
consumption drives the wedge between the price and marginal utility given in (10).
Using the price arbitrage dpt/dt = δpt together with the boundary condition pT = p¯, the
stock depletion equation dQt/dt = −qt, and condition (10), the equilibrium path is fully
determined. Figure 1 depicts how the price and the marginal utility develop over time.10
Let us now discuss the limiting cases. Sellers can expect a surplus share due to their
ability to wait for the substitute price, and when δ → 0, the price path shifts up together
with the marginal utility path. When δ = 0, patience is extreme and the Coase conjecture
10The figure was plotted using U(q) = log(q), which leads to an explicit solution for the (remaining)
stock
Qt = e
δt(Q0 −
1
2δp
eδT ) +
1
2δp
eδ(T−t),
where T is found from the boundary condition QT = 0. The descriptive features of the equilibrium
follow from this solution.
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T t
pt
p¯
u′(qt)
p
u′(qt)
Figure 1: Equilibrium price path and marginal utility
arises. Competitive sellers capture the full resource surplus; there is no reason to accept
a lower price than the buyer’s outside option.
As q¯ → 0 (and W (q¯) → 0), the equilibrium converges to the outcome suggested by
the durable-good analog (Ho¨rner and Kamien, 2004). We see from the figure that the
marginal utility path is S-shaped. As the outside option vanishes, the buyer initially
follows a marginal utility path that is growing at a rate close the interest rate but, in the
end, distorts consumption choices by stretching the overall consumption period. When
q¯ = 0, this stretching becomes extreme, the stock is never exactly exhausted, and the
price collapses to zero. The result stated is hereby demonstrated.
It is natural ask how things change when extraction costs become dependent on the
remaining stock, i.e., when unit cost increases with depletion, c′(Qt) < 0. Using the
boundary for the price path and the Hotelling rule, we can express the equilibrium price
as
pt = e
−δ(T−t)p¯ +
∫ T
t
δc(Qτ )e
−δ(τ−t)dτ.
The resource cannot be sold for anything less than p¯ and, therefore, the equilibrium
price converges to this level independently of whether the stock is economically (last
units not extracted, p¯ < c(0)) or physically depleted (all units extracted, p¯ > c(0)). The
equilibrium delay of consumption by the buyer lowers the price path by postponing the
arrival of the substitute much the same way as explained above – the substitute price
appears independently of the cost structure in the price equation. This effect is a source
of surplus-share to the buyer, when the switch to the substitute takes place at some
12
date, and discounting is positive. For these reasons, the Proposition applies under more
general cost structure.
4 Concluding remarks
We conclude by discussing some features of resource markets that may help the resource
buyer to escape the conjecture, and how one might restore the equivalence between the
resource and durable-good models. For the latter, one might ask what is the analog of
the resource substitute in the durable-good model? Recall that in the resource model,
the substitute provides an outside valuation for the market (the choke price) with which
the good can be ultimately sold. We have shown that in subgame-perfect equilibrium
the substitute changes the economic logic of the resource model in a fundamental way.
It is therefore important to understand if a similar mechanism can be imported to the
durable-good model.
To import the idea of the substitute to the durable-goods, one would need to assume
two types of goods, durable and non-durable, such that the monopolist first serves the
pool of customers buying the highly-valued durable good, and then switches to serve
the (competitive) non-durable segment of the market for some flow profit of W > 0.
Knowing the existence of the non-durable segment, which can always procure their non-
durables at some competitive price, say p, the monopolist would not be able to credibly
commit to never attend the non-durable segment at price p, which would ultimately
prevent him from pricing its last durable units above p. Thus, these ”outside consumers”
would in principle improve the bargaining position of the durable-good buyers, forcing
the monopolist to leave a fraction of the durable-good surplus with the consumers (for
example, when they have a constant valuation for the durable). It is immediately clear
that this ”backstop” interpretation is not at all that natural in the durable-good case
—the non-durable or flow benefit from buying a durable is already part of the original
model—, while the substitute is an esencial part of the resource model. Hence, there are
good substance-related and economic reasons to argue that the two theories are distinct.
One can still speculate if any of the strategies that alleviate the Coase conjecture in
the durable-good model can work in the resource model. It seems not. Ausubel and
Deneckere (1989) require the buyer to never adopt the substitute. Strategies aimed at
slowing down production, either through capacity constraints or convex costs (McAfee
and Wiseman, 2008; Kahn, 1986), are already part of the resource model. Neither the
introduction of discrete agents (Bagnoli et al. 1989) or the entry of new resource suppliers
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(Sobel, 1991) change anything fundamental in the resource problem. And Karp’s (1996)
depreciation does not apply either.
There is nevertheless a different way in which the buyer might be able to escape the
conjecture, or more precisely, retain a larger share of the overall surplus. To maintain a
close connection to the durable-good framework, in this paper we adopted the traditional
and somewhat stark view on the backstop arrival. Once the choke price is reached, the
substitute enters the market with perfectly elastic supply. Recent research has developed
a multi-sector description of the resource substitution process such that the transition is
gradual as sectors move substitutes at different times (e.g., Chakravorty, Roumasset, and
Tse 1997). Gerlagh and Liski (2008) have shown that adjustment costs in the form of
time-to-build period for the substitute, can bring about considerable bargaining power to
the buyer side of the resource market. This, again, is a resource-market specific addition
to the Coase conjecture discussion. We believe it is a fruitful agenda to further explore
elements that may shape the strategic and dynamic relationships in exhaustible-resource
markets.
5 Appendix: Buyer’s continuous-time consumption
rule
The buyer’s equilibrium payoff in continuous time satisfies
V (Qt) =
∫ T
t
[U(qτ )− pτqτ ]e
−δ(τ−t)dτ + e−δ(T−t)
W (q¯)
δ
(11)
where the choices at time points are evaluated along the equilibrium path (recall that
W (q¯) = U(q¯)− p¯q¯). When time is discrete and the period length is ∆, the payoff to the
buyer at stock level Qt can be expressed as
V (Qt) = [U(qt)− ptqt]∆ + e
−δ∆V (Qt −∆qt). (12)
For a small ∆, this equation can be approximated as
0 = [U(qt)− ptqt]∆−∆δe
−δ∆V (Qt −∆qt)−∆e
−δ∆q
t
VQ(Qt −∆qt).
In the continuous-time limit, ∆→ 0,
δV (Qt) = [U(qt)− ptqt]− qtVQ(Qt).
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The equilibrium choice of qt maximizes the right hand side of (12), and satisfies
[U ′(qt)− pt −
∂pt
∂qt
qt]∆−∆e
−δ∆VQ(Qt −∆qt) = 0, (13)
or, in the limit ∆→ 0,
[U ′(qt)− pt −
∂pt
∂qt
qt]− VQ(Qt) = 0, (14)
To find an expression for VQ(Qt), totally differentiate the equilibrium value function
(11) to get
dQtVQ(Qt) = dV =∫ T
t
[U ′(qτ )− pτ −
∂pτ
∂qτ
qτ ]dqτe
−δ(τ−t)dτ + (15)
e−δ(T−t)[U(qT )− pT qT − U(q¯) + p¯q¯]dT − (16)∫ T
t
qτdpτe
−δ(τ−t)dτ. (17)
By the fact that we are considering qt along the equilibrium path, the expression on line
(15) is zero: marginal perturbation of the choice variable yieds a zero improvement in
the value. In addition, since the buyer switches to the substitute at T , we have qT = q¯
and pT = p¯; hence, the value of expression on line (16) is also zero. For the last term,
note that the consumption cost can be written as
∫ T
t
qτpτe
−δ(τ−t)dτ = e−δ(T−t)p¯
∫ T
t
qτdτ = e
−δ(T−t)p¯Qt,
because equilibrium prices grow at the rate of interest. Therefore, the differential on
line (17) captures the effect coming from postponement of the choke price. Thus, the
expression for dQtVQ(Qt) simplifies to
dQtVQ(Qt) = −δe
−δ(T−t)p¯QtdT = −δptQtdτ, (18)
where dT = dτ , because marginal increase in T equals the period length dτ . Since also
dt = dτ , and dQt = −qtdt, we can write (18) as
VQ(Qt) = δpt
Qt
qt
. (19)
Reconsider now the first-order condition (13), and use dt = ∆ to rewrite it as
[U ′(qt)− pt −
∂pt
∂qt
qt]dt− e
−δdtVQ(Qt − dtqt)dt = 0.
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Evaluate (19) at Qt+dt and rewrite the first-order condition further to obtain
[U ′(qt)− pt −
∂pt
∂qt
qt]− e
−δdtδpt+dt
Qt+dt
qt+dt
= 0.
As dt→ 0, the equilibrium direct price effect is zero, ∂pt/∂qt = 0. The equilibrium price
path depends on Qt only, as instantaneous consumption has no effect on what the market
can expect to receive in the future. The equilibrium consumption rule then becomes
U ′(qt)− pt − δpt
Qt
qt
= 0,
which completes the proof.
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